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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78A-3-102(3)(j). Pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Supreme 
Court transferred this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, which has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)0"). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue One. The Appellant failed to marshal all of the evidence in support of the District 
Court's trial judgment and Ruling on Appellant's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. 
Standard of Review. Marshalling all of the evidence in support of the District Court's 
judgment and ruling is a question of fact: whether the Appellant marshaled all of the evidence in 
support of the District Court's trial judgment and Ruling on Appellant's post trial motion and 
whether Appellant has demonstrated that when the Court's judgment and ruling is viewed in a 
light most favorable to upholding the judgment and ruling the Court erred in making its 
judgment and ruling.is reviewed for correctness. See College Irrigation v. Logan River & 
Blacksmith Fork Irrigation, 135 P.2d 123 (Utah 1989). 
Issue Two. Whether the trial court was correct when it concluded that the Roberts 
waived their claim for quiet title of the north boundary of their property west of the Roberts' 
home based upon (1) Mr. Roberts' testimony waiving his right, (2) the Roberts were represented 
by legal counsel, (3) Mrs. Roberts did not refote or clarify Mr. Roberts' waiver during her 
testimony subsequent to Mr. Roberts testimony. 
Roberts v. Russell 
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Standard of Review. "Waiver presents a mixed question of law and fact; whether the 
trial court employed the proper standard of waiver presents a legal question which is reviewed 
for correctness, and the actions or events allegedly supporting waiver are factual in nature and 
should be reviewed as factual determinations. See Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 117 (Utah 2004). 
< 
Issue Three. Whether the trial court was correct when it concluded that Mrs. Roberts is 
not entitled to an order enjoining Dr. Russell from further trespass on her land, in light of Mr. 
Roberts waiver of any claim of trespass on property on the north property boundary west of the 
Roberts' house and the Court's finding that the fence is located on a public easement. 
Standard of Review. Whether certain acts constitute trespass is a mixed question of law 
and fact, which is reviewed as factual determination. See Walker Drug Co., Inc. v. La Sal Oil ( 
Co., 972 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1998). 
Issue Four. Whether the trial court was correct when it declined to award their attorney 
( 
fees to the Roberts for prosecuting their claims against Dr. Russell in this matter. 
Standard of Review. A trial court's interpretation of language authorizing attorney fees 
is reviewed for correctness. R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 40 P.3d 1119 (Utah 2002). < 
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no statutory provisions whose interpretation is central to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE i 
The primary goal of Appellant's appeal is not to quiet title or force Dr. Russell to move 
his fence. The primary goal is to obtain attorney's fees against Dr. Russell as Appellant's 
counsel admitted to the Court during oral argument on Appellant's Motion to Alter or Amend 
Roberts v. Russell 
Appellee Brief Page 2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Judgment. This purpose is memorialized in Minute Entry and Order Following Hearing re: 
Defendants' Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment as to Cross-Defendant Dr. Roger Russell. 
The initial complaint in this matter was filed by Plaintiffs Jim Purkey and Jan Purkey 
against the Defendant/Cross Claimant and Appellants Max Roberts and Jilene Roberts on 
January 23,2007. (R. at 1.) The Roberts later filed a counterclaim against the Plaintiffs on 
September 14, 2007 (R. at 58) and subsequently filed a cross-claim against the Cross-Defendant 
and Appellee, Dr. Roger Russell on September 24, 2008. (R. at 101.) A two-day trial was held 
on the Purkey's complaint and Roberts' counterclaim and cross-claim March 22-23,2010 before 
the honorable Judge Marvin D. Bagley. (R. at 659.) 
During Max Roberts' testimony the court intervened asking the following of Mr. Roberts: 
The Court: From your house going west, do you claim that Mr. Purkey is responsible 
for that road being off where it should be? 
Mr. Roberts: No sir. 
The Court: So your only concern in this lawsuit is from your house going 
east? 
Mr. Roberts: Going east. I put that road in, sir. 
(Tr.l 205:7-13.) 
Mrs. Roberts was present during Mr. Roberts' testimony as were the Roberts attorneys. 
Mrs. Roberts testified on the following day and did not dispute, take issue to or deny Mr. Roberts 
testimony as shown above. 
At the end of the trial, the District Court made findings of fact and conclusions of law on 
the record, which were finally prepared by Appellant's and memorialized in the District Court's 
Roberts v. Russell 
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written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment, both entered September 15, 
2010, one hundred and seventy six (176) days after the trial. 
Mrs. Roberts filed a Motion to Amend or Alter the Judgment on September 27, 2010, (R. 
at 690) which the District Court denied. (R.at 879.) In its Minute Entry and Order re: 
Defendants' Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment as to Cross Defendant Dr. Roger Russell, the 
District Court found that the goal of the Roberts' Motion "was to obtain attorney's fees against 
Dr. Russell for the Roberts." The Court further stated that "[t]o his credit, Counsel admitted this 
was so." The Minute Entry and Order Following Hearing Re Defendants' Motion to Alter or 
Amend Judgment as to Cross-Defendant Dr. Roger Russell was entered March 31,2011. Mrs. 
Roberts filed a Notice of Appeal on April 14, 2011. ( 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
I. BACKGROUND OF THE LITIGATION 
( 
Appellant Jilene Roberts is the owner of real property located in rural Sanpete County. 
(R. at 677.) She owned this real property as a joint tenant with and was a co-party in this 
litigation with her husband, Max Roberts, until he passed away on April 5. 2010. (R. at 677; ^ 
731-32.) Appellee Dr. Roger Russell is the owner of real property that abuts the north boundary 
of Appellant's real property. (R. at 677.) On September 4,1992, Mr. Roberts, Theo Mulder, Jo 
Newton and Jerry Nielsen signed a document designating the road running along the north 
boundary of Appellant's real property as a public road. On May 6,1998, the Appellant signed a 
quitclaim deed purporting to give a right-of-way over the north 32 feet of Appellant's property to 
Jim and Jan Purkey. Sometime after 1999, a barbed-wire fence was constructed between the real 
Roberts v. Russell 
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properties. (R. at 677.) On October 4,2002, the Defendants, including the Appellant, signed a 
dedicated a plat map, indicating that a 32 foot strip of land dedicated as a street for the perpetual 
use of land owners and public safety access. Sometime after 1999, a barbed-wire fence was 
constructed on a line near the border between the properties. (R. at 677.) It was never disputed 
and therefore, must be considered admitted, that at some point in time between 1999, when the 
fence was erected, and the filing of Appellants' cross-claim, Dr. Russell discovered that the 
fence separating the properties had been knocked down, that Mr. Roberts was parked and burned 
material on what was considered to be Dr. Russell's property, and that when confronted with this 
information, Mr. Roberts put the fence back up, in the same location as it had been erected by 
Dr. Russell. 
This matter is a part of a larger action brought by the Purkeys against the Roberts, 
regarding a disputed easement on the Roberts' real property. (R. at 101.) As part of determining 
the location of the platted easement with respect to the road which was actually on Roberts' 
property, the Roberts commissioned a survey and at that time learned that the fence separating 
Russell's and Roberts' real property was actually on the Roberts' property, encroaching between 
7 and 14.5 feet. (R. at 678-79.) 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The Roberts filed a cause of action against Dr. Russell for quiet title and trespass on 
September 24,2008, as a cross-claim within the pre-existing litigation between the Purkeys and 
the Roberts. (R. at 101.) The cross-claim was answered pro se by Dr. Russell on October 10, 
2008. (R. at 107.) The Roberts filed for summary judgment on the claim on March 30,2009. 
Roberts v. Russell 
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(R. at 127.) The Roberts' motion for summary judgment was granted in an order dated April 29, 
2009 for Dr. Russell's failure to respond. (R. at 255.) On July 23,2009, Dr. Russell obtained 
counsel and filed a Motion to Set Aside the summary judgment order, (R. at 292) which was 
granted in an Order entered on October 4,2009. (R. at 394.) As a condition of setting aside the 
judgment, the District Court ordered that "if Cross-Defendant does not prevail in his defense, 
Cross-Claimants shall be entitled to their reasonable attorney's fees from . . . May 27,2009. (R. 
at 395.) 
A. Trial 
The matter went to trial on March 22 & 23,2010. (R. at 659.) At the beginning of the 
trial the Court accepted the following facts as admitted: (Tr.l 26:17-22) 
1. That the fence separating the Roberts' real property from the Russell property was 
constructed between January 1999 and January 2002; 
2. That either Dr. Russell or his predecessors in interest caused the fence to be built, and 
did not rely upon any representation by either Roberts or by Ludlow Engineering in 
deciding where to build the fence; and 
3. That neither Dr. Russell nor his predecessors in interest signed or in any way 
participated in the creation of the Purkey Subdivision Plat A. 
The undisputed evidence at trial was that the fence separating the Russell real property 
from the Roberts' real property was erected 14.5 feet on the Roberts' real property on the west 
end of the property and 7.4 feet on the Roberts' real property on the east end of the property, 
(R.at 678-79) well within the 32 foot public easement running along the north boundary of the 
Roberts' real property. 
Roberts v. Russell 
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At trial, the main issue before the Court was the location of the road that was used by the 
Purkeys to access their property, which was to the east of the Roberts' real property. Before the 
Purkeys bought their land to the east of the Roberts, the Roberts had put in a road. This pre-
existing road was situated near the north boundary of the Roberts' real property and stretched 
approximately 600 feet west of the Roberts' home to the west edge of the Roberts' real property. 
Power poles existed on the north side of the road. (Tr 1 186:20-187:3.) 
Sometime in 1998, the Purkeys asked the Roberts for a right of way over the north thirty-
two (32) feet of the Roberts' real property. (R. at 677.) The parties later executed Purkey 
Subdivision Plat A, which platted the 32-foot right of way west of the Roberts' home to match 
the road as it existed, as both parties mistakenly believed the road to be within the 32-foot right 
of way. Based upon the parties' mutual mistake, the Purkeys matched the pre-existing road and 
constructed the road to their home outside the 32-foot right of way. 
Counsel for the Appellants was clear in his questioning of his client, Mr. Roberts, about 
the placement of power poles and the road in question. Subsequently, the District Court, in order 
to further clarify Mr. Roberts' testimony regarding his property line and the road west of the 
Roberts' home, asked the following questions of Mr. Roberts: 
The Court: From your house going west, do you claim that Mr. Purkey is responsible 
for that road being off where it should be? 
Mr. Roberts: No sir. 
The Court: So your only concern in this lawsuit is from your house going 
east? 
Mr. Roberts: Going east. I put that road in, sir. 
Roberts v, Russell 
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(Tr.l 205:7-13.) 
Thereafter, Counsel for Mr. Roberts' did not clarify Mr. Roberts' testimony, nor did Mrs. 
Roberts dispute, disagree with, or clarify Mr. Roberts' previous testimony when she was on the 
stand. 
As stated in Appellant's brief, the Court did clarify Mr. Roberts' waiver of his claim 
against Dr. Russell during Counsel's closing arguments. The Court clearly stated, "I said [to Mr. 
Roberts] do you want to change anything from your house looking west? He said '[N]o, I don't 
want to change anything from my house looking west. I'm only concerned from my house east.' 
The Court went on to state that it "interpreted he [Mr. Roberts] was waiving his claim . . . I 
think your client waives his claim." (Tr.2 23:6-24:19.) { 
Therefore, the District Court found that when Mr. Roberts had testified, he had waived 
the Roberts' claims against Dr. Russell to establish quiet title to the north boundary from the 
Roberts' home west. (R. at 679, 683; Tr.2 50:16-18) 
The Court further denied Roberts' claims for trespass (Tr.2 50:13-15) and finally, the 
District Court denied Roberts' claim for attorney fees against Dr. Russell. (R. at 683; Tr.2 51: < 
19-52;1.) 
B. Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment 
Appellant's counsel submitted the Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law and the 
written Judgment approximately 170 days after the trial, giving Appellees adequate time to 
research and prepare a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. Appellant's motion was denied and 
Roberts v. Russell 
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an Order was entered on March 31,2011. Thereafter, Mrs. Roberts brought a Motion to Alter or 
Amend. (R. at 690.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should uphold the findings and rulings of the Sixth District Court in this 
matter because (I) Mr. Roberts clearly and unequivocally stated his waiver of any claims of 
quiet title for the north property west of his house and Mrs. Roberts, who was represented by 
counsel did not repudiate or dispute that waiver; (II) Mr. Roberts' waiver then made the 
concerns of the north boundary west of the Roberts' house moot; (III) the District Court's 
ruling on trespass was correct as Dr. Russell's fence was located on a general public easement on 
the Roberts' real property; and (IV) the District Court correctly found, therefore, that no parties 
prevailed in the trial of this matter and awarded no attorneys fee. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: 
THE APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL ALL OF THE EVIDENCE 
IN SUPPORT OF THE DISTRICT COURT'S TRIAL JUDGMENT AND RULING 
ON APPELLANT'S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT, NOR HAS 
APPELLANT DEMONSTRATED THAT WHEN THE COURT'S JUDGMENT 
AND RULING IS VIEWED IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE 
JUDGMENT AND RULING, THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS 
JUDGMENT AND RULLING 
This Court and the Utah Supreme Court consistently hold that "it is incumbent upon 
appellants to marshal all of the evidence in support of the findings of the trial court and then to 
demonstrate that even when viewed in the light most favorable to the to the trial findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and judgment and the denial of Appellant's Motion to Alter or Amend 
Roberts v. Russell 
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Judgment, the evidence is insufficient to support its findings." College Irrigation v. Logan River 
& Blacksmith Fork Irrigation. 135 P.2d 123 (Utah 1989). Without such marshaling or analysis, 
this Court should decline the Appellant's request to overturn the District Court's rulings in this 
matter. K.J. Scharffv. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1989). Dr. Russell should not be 
compelled to canvass the record and cull from it all of the testimony, exhibits, or inferences 
which, taken together, persuaded the District Court to rule in his favor. 
POINT II.
 { 
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN RULING THAT THE ROBERTS 
HAD WAIVED THEIR CLAIM FOR QUIET TITLE TO THE NORTH 
BOUNDARY WEST OF THEIR HOUSE 
A. Mr. Roberts clearly and unequivocally waived the Roberts' claim for quiet title of { 
the north property. 
Defendant Max Roberts was Appellant's key witness in the District Court trial, testifying 
for approximately four (4) hours. 
Waiver is "the intentional relinquishment of a known right." Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 
1226, 1230 (Utah App. 1988). To waive a right there must be an existing right, benefit, or ^ 
advantage; knowledge of its existence; and an intention to relinquish it." 1<L The party's action 
or conduct must unequivocally evince an intent to waive or must at least be inconsistent with any 
other intent. hL 
Moreover, "[w]aiver is an equitable doctrine based upon fairness and justice. The 
existence of waiver ordinarily is a question of fact and is foremost a question of intent". Hecla 
Mining Co. v. Star-Morning: Co,, 839 P.2d 1192,1196 (Idaho 1992). Appellant's authority 
Roberts v. Russell 
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supports Appellee's theory that Mr. Roberts intended to waive any and all claims regarding his 
property west of his home. The Court's question was clear and unambiguous, "So your only 
concern in this lawsuit is from your house going east?" To which Mr. Roberts stated on the 
record, "Going east. I put that road in, sir". (Tr.l 205: 7-13.) 
There was an existing right in the present matter, the Defendants' and Appellant's right to 
seek an injunction to force Dr. Russell to move his fence to the legal line separating the 
properties belonging to the Appellant and Dr. Russell and to bring a claim to quiet title to the 
land between the existing fence and the legal boundary between the two properties. 
Mr. and Mrs. Roberts had knowledge of their existing right. 
The Court relied upon Mr. Roberts' testimony and direct responses to the Court's 
questioning in determining that Appellants waived their claims to quiet title against the Purkeys 
and Dr. Russell for all points west of the Roberts' home. 
Mr. Roberts clearly stated to the District Court, when responding to the Court's direct 
question, that his only concern in this lawsuit was from his house "going east", thereby clearly 
waiving any claims against Dr. Russell for concerns about the property line to the west of the 
Roberts' home. 
Mr. Roberts' counsel continued direct examination of Mr. Roberts following the Court 
direct examination and counsel failed to clarify or rescind Mr. Roberts' response to the Court's 
questioning. 
Roberts v. Russell 
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Subsequently, Defendant Jilene Roberts took the stand on the following day, March 23, 
2010, and testified from approximately 2:08 until 2:40. Mrs. Roberts testified for approximately 
thirty three (33) minutes. 
During Mrs. Roberts' testimony and questioning by her counsel, Mrs. Roberts did not 
refute, clarify, or even attempt to explain or question Mr. Roberts' testimony waiving the 
Defendants' claims against Dr. Russell for quiet title of property near the northern boundary of 
the Roberts' property west of the Roberts' home. 
Given Mr. Roberts' clear testimony and Mrs. Roberts failure to address this issue, the 
controversy concerning all matters and claims west of the Roberts' home became moot. 
"The strong judicial policy against giving advisory opinions dictates that courts refrain 1 
from adjudicating moot questions." Merhish v. HA. Fulton & Associates. 646 P.2d 731, 732 
(Utah 1982). See also State v. StronquisL 639 P.2d 171 (Utah 1981). Based upon Utah's judicial 
policy, the District Court in this matter had no position but to refrain from further adjudication of 
Mr. Roberts' claims against Dr. Russell regarding quiet title or trespass on real property west of 
the Roberts' home. . 
Dr. Russell acknowledges that express statements and affirmative conduct must be 
unequivocal and inconsistent with any other intent to support a waiver and concedes that waivers 
should not be easily inferred. 
Mr. Roberts clearly stated that he was only concerned about his north property line to the 
east of his home and Mrs. Roberts added nothing to Mr. Roberts' testimony, nor did she dispute 
< 
it, thereby inferring her agreement with Mr. Roberts' position and waiver. 
Roberts v. Russell 
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During Appellant's counsel's closing argument, the Court interrupted and asked, "What 
is it you are asking against Mr. Russell?" 
Appellant's counsel stated, "Against Dr. Russell we would like to quiet title to the north 
boundary according to the property description.^ 
The Court then stated, "How come when I asked your client what he was asking in this 
lawsuit, I asked him specifically because I wanted to know this. I said, do you want to change 
anything form your house looking west. He said, 'No, I don't want to change anything from my 
house looking west. I'm only concerned from my house eas t . ' . . . I interpreted he was waiving 
his claim for anything from his house. I don't think it is fair to Mr. Russell for him to say that 
and then come back and not give him a chance to oppose it. I think you client waives his 
claims." (Tr.2 23: 6-24:19) 
The District Court not only heard Mr. Roberts' testimony, it asked the question to clarify 
Mr. Roberts' waiver. The District Court was, therefore, in the best position to determine Mr. 
Roberts' intent. Appellant's failure to request a continuance when confronted with the Court's 
position during closing arguments indicates Appellant's acquiescence to Mr. Roberts' waiver. 
Initially, Mr. Roberts and the Appellant were seeking to quiet title against Dr. Russell and 
force him to move his fence along the north boundary of the Roberts' real property, including the 
property line to the west of the Roberts' home. In waiving their claims for quiet title, the Roberts 
have not relinquished ownership of any land. The legal boundaries have been established 
through the trial of this matter. 
Roberts v. Russell 
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B. Mrs. Roberts failure to dispute or repudiate Mr. Roberts9 waiver supports the 
partiesy waiver of the claim for quiet Me west of the Roberts' home. 
Appellant's argument that the acts of one joint tenant cannot bind the property without 
assent from the other joint tenants is misplaced in this matter. It is the rule of this court that, 
while under joint tenancy both parties hold concurrent ownership in the same property, a joint 
tenant of real property by conveying his interest therein severs and terminates the joint tenancy 
by creation of a tenancy in common. See Shiba v. Shiba. 186 P.3d 329 (Utah 2008), see also 
Tracy-Collins Trust Co. v. Goeltz. 301 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1956). 
Therefore, if it is determined that Mr. Roberts' waiver gives ownership of the land 
between the legal boundary of the real properties and the fence to Dr. Russell, Mr. Roberts has 
severed and terminated the joint tenancy and Mrs. Roberts now owns the property in tenancy in 
common with Dr. Russell. 
C. Waiver of a claim after a proceeding has begun does not require a motion. 
While the express language of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 41(b) states a defendant 
must bring a motion to dismiss to enforce a court order, Utah courts have consistently ruled "that 
a court may dismiss a claim sua sponte, without a motion by the defendant". Panos v. Smith's 
Food & Drue Centers. Inc.. 913 P.2d 363, 364 (Utah App. 1996). 
Wherefore, the District Court was afforded the authority to dismiss or consider Mr. 
Roberts' claims waived without a motion from the parties. 
Roberts v. Russell 
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D. The District Court correctly amended Cross-Defendant's pleadings. 
Appellant's argument that Dr. Russell did not assert an affirmative defense of waiver is 
not well taken. Mr. Robert's waiver took place at the trial of this matter, when questioned by the 
District Court. Dr. Russell could not have anticipated Mr. Roberts' waiver and therefore could 
not properly plead the affirmative defense of waiver prior to Mr. Roberts' waiver of his claims 
concerning property west of his house prior to the trial of this matter. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) provides two situations in which a court can rule on 
issues not raised by the pleadings. The first situation - the mandatory 15(b) amendment to 
conform - requires the trial court to consider issues not raised in the pleadings if the parties tried 
the issues by express or implied consent. See Fibro Trust Inc. v. Brahman Financial Inc. 91A 
P.2d 288 (Utah 1999). See also Keller v. Southwood North Medical Pavilion. Inc.. 959 P.2dl02 
(Utah 1998). The Appellant's failure to object to Dr. Russell's testimony regarding his 
understanding of the location of the property boundary line and Roberts' past conduct which 
implied the correct location of the fence in question, supports the argument that this issue was 
tried by implied consent. Fibro Trust at 291. 
The second situation - the permissive 15(b) amendment - was denied by the District 
Court in Dr. Russell's closing argument. 
The District Court found, in paragraph 7 of its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
re Defendants' Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment as to Cross-Defendant Dr. Roger Russell, 
"that the prior pleadings of the parties were effectively amended by trial evidence as provided by 
URCPRulel5". 
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POINT III. 
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT WHEN IT DENIED THE ROBERTS' 
CLAIM FOR TRESPASS 
On September 4,1992, Mr. Roberts, Theo Mulder, Jo Newton and Jerry Nielsen signed a 
document designating the road running along the north boundary of Appellant's real property as 
a public road. On May 6,1998, the Appellant signed a quitclaim deed purporting to give a right-
of-way over the north 32 feet of Appellant's property to Jim and Jan Purkey. On October 4, 
2002, the Defendants, including the Appellant, signed a dedicated a plat map, indicating that a 32 
foot strip of land dedicated as a street for the perpetual use of land owners and public safety 
access. 
It is unclear exactly when Dr. Russell built his fence, but the District Court found it was 
built in approximately 2000. 
As stated in Appellant's brief, a defendant is liable for trespass when "(2) the defendant 
interfered with the plaintiffs exclusive right to possession of the property by entering the 
plaintiffs land". 
The District Court heard the testimony and inspected the evidence presented at the trial of 
this matter and ruled as a Conclusion of Law; "[t]he 1998 right-of-way is valid as a matter of law 
. . . " The right of way extended 32-feet from the north boundary of Appellant's real property. 
Dr. Robert's fence is located within that right of way, being 4.5 feet to 14.4 feet across the 
property boundary. Dr. Robert's fence and use of Appellant's real property does not and cannot 
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interfere with the Appellant's "exclusive right to possession of the property", as it is located on 
the public easement. (R. at 678.) 
The District Court specifically found that the claim of trespass, against Dr. Russell, 
"involves that portion of the Roberts' property that is already subject to a general easement by 
the public, and Dr. Russell likely had the right to be on that property as well as anyone else." 
POINT IV 
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT WHEN IT DENIED APPELLANT'S 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
It must be noted that Utah follows the traditional American rule, regarding awarding 
attorney's fees, which states that "attorney fees are not recoverable by a prevailing party, unless 
authorized by statute or contract." Gallezos v. Llovd. 178 P.3d 922, 924 (Utah App. 2008). The 
Gallegos case is on point as it addresses unintentional trespass on real property. The Gallegos 
court went on to find that "[t]he present case does not fall under any of the previously-recognized 
exceptions to the general rule against awarding attorney fees in tort cases." Gallegos at 924. See 
also Gardiner v. York. 153 P.3d 791 (Utah App. 2006). There are no facts to distinguish this 
matter from the Gallegos case and, therefore, this matter does not fall under any previously-
recognized exception to the general rule against awarding attorney fees in tort cases. 
Moreover, Appellee has cited no statutory reference to guide this court in awarding 
attorney fees. 
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The District Court found that [n]o party prevailed in this litigation for the purposes of 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d) and found, therefore, that no party is entitled to their costs. See Paragraph 
35 of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law from the trial of this matter. 
'Trial courts apply a flexible and reasoned approach to the determination of who 
prevailed at trial." Gallezos at 926. See also AX. Whipple Plumbinz & Heatinz v. Guv. 94 P.3d 
270 (Utah 2004). The Court in this matter did just that and adjusted the location of the road in 
question in accordance to the plat map. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellee, Dr. Roger Russell, respectfully requests that this 
Court uphold the District Court's decision. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this g g ^ k y of November 2011. 
& . 
Charles W. Hanna 
Attorney for Cross-Defendant/Appellee 
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